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This article considers the trend of struc-
tural changes in the political elite of the Re-
public of Lithuania in the post-Soviet period 
through analyzing the role of the so-called 
“moral politicians” — intellectuals, artists, 
and cultural figures, who played a decisive 
role in the period of the communist system di-
sintegration and further development of the 
country's policy. 
The role of the political elite, which is un-
derstood according to R. Putnam and J. Hig-
ley's definition, is considered in the conditi-
ons of political instability and uncertainty ty-
pical of transformation processes. In this con-
text, the role of key actors is interpreted on 
the basis of the methodological structure of 
the so-called Stanford model developed by G. 
Almond and P. Bourdieu's theory of capital. 
This article reconstructs the course of po-
litical changes in the Republic of Lithuania at 
the initial stage of its independence, in the 
framework of which the key role was played 
by «moral politicians», most of whom subse-
quently retired from politics. 
Focusing on the situation in Lithuania, 
this research sets out to show the continuous 
dependence of today's policies of the Baltic 
States on the key choices made by the autho-
rities at the turn of 1980s—1990s. 
Today, Russian political science lacks 
concrete regional studies into the issues of 
changes of elites in the context of research on 
the processes of postcommunist transforma-
tions. This work addresses the scientific inter-
pretation of the content of mechanisms of 
«new» political elite development in postcom-
munist societies under the influence of endo-
genous and exogenous factors in the course of 
transformation. The stabilisation of elite for-
mation processes in Lithuania, the assessment 
of patterns and trends, the identification of 
power centres and the character of intra-elite 
interaction, and a profound understanding of 
the functioning of Lithuanian political system 
in general will allow Russia to formulate a 
more efficient policy towards the Baltic Sta-
tes, which would promptly respond to emer-
ging challenges. 
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When analysing the political transformation in the countries of the Cen-
tral and Eastern Europe (CEE) following the collapse of the communist bloc 
as a provisional, instable political process and a transition of the system from 
one state into another, it is important to emphasize the role of political elite1, 
which acts as a key agent of changes. The importance of the role played by 
the political elite in the transitional political processes can be explained by 
the distortion of the institutional process of development [4]. In the times of 
stability, the political process rests on institutions; however, in the periods of 
radical changes, the representatives of political elite, whose decisions and 
actions affect to a significant degree the achievement of political stability, 
come to the foreground. Vilfredo Pareto, one of the founders of the classical 
theory of elites wrote about the social equilibrium, which is to be achieved 
through a struggle inside the political elite (the circulation of “lions” and 
“foxes”), which he believed to be a driving force and an agent of the political 
process [16]. 
A society transforming from one state into another and evolving into 
what Karl Popper called “open society” inevitably acquires one of its main 
characteristics — it is an open and not a closed society, where a large num-
ber of its members can climb the social ladder and occupy higher hierarchi-
cal positions [30, p. 218]. The political elite per se is an open system. Poten-
tially, any person, regardless of his/her education, occupation, and property 
status, (in crisis periods, even representatives of the fringes of the society) 
has an opportunity to join the political elite [24]. The doors of the elite open 
widely to let “fresh blood” in during regime changes and development crises 
characterized by dynamic political changes. This period is relatively short, 
and as soon as the regime stabilizes, the elite tries to “close the doors” again 
[26, p. 92]. While Karl Popper conceived the history of humanity as the his-
tory of political power interpreted from the perspective of a struggle for the 
open society [31, p. 320], for Vilfredo Pareto, history is a “graveyard of eli-
tes”, the finale of the struggle between groups vying for power [17]. 
This struggle was a serious test for “moral politicians”. The Hungarian 
researcher, Attila Ágh [1], and later the Polish scholar, Jacek Wasilewski 
[23], called the representatives of creative and academic circles one of the 
key actors of post-communist transformations at the initial stage of transi-
tion. It is the period of regaining independence, when the foundation for fur-
ther development was provided and institutional choices were made. 
An effective analysis of a politically unstable political system can be 
conducted with the use of the research model of development crisis proposed 
in the framework of the so called Stanford project by a group of scholars 
from the namesake university lead by G. Almond [2]. The model based on 
                                                     
1 Political elite is interpreted here in accordance with the definition given by R. Put-
nam, j. Higley, O.V. Gaman-Golutvina, i.e. it consists of those holding strategic po-
sitions within institutions and movements of power capable of exerting regular and 
significant influence on national political results and possessing the necessary re-
source potential. 
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juxtaposing the periods of stable development and periods of system develo-
pment crises, offers different theoretical and methodological approaches to 
research, and shows a greater heuristic potential for understanding political 
transformations and the role of agents in this process than, for example, D. 
Easton’s model designed to describe a stable system [6]. In the framework of 
the “Stanford” four-phase model of a development crisis, the processes of 
political transformations in CEE can be presented as stages of transition 
from the system synchronization through desynchronizing to resynchroniza-
tion, where the state of synchronization suggests a correspondence between 
the structures and the functions of the system. At the same time, in the pe-
riod of dynamic changes, at the crossroads of internal and external impacts, 
the political elite served as a key actor — an agent of demand mobilization. 
The Russian political philosopher, B. Kapustin, suggests considering 
politics in two ways — as small and big politics. In his opinion, small poli-
tics means maintaining the status quo, it does not require extraordinary ef-
forts, the only thing required is to keep the system functioning. Big poli-
tics, in its turn, does not reproduce the existing order, but generates a new 
one, creating “new rules for a new game”, “new beginnings” [25, p. 354]. 
The transformation experienced by the Lithuanian society in the transi-
tion period can be classed under “big politics”. 
According to Verena Fritz, who analysed the transformation processes 
in Russia, Belarus, Ukraine, and Lithuania after the collapse of the commu-
nist bloc, the common starting point for ensuing transformations was the in-
stitutional erosion. Since the late 1980s, old limitations, rules, and institu-
tions had been weakened, and new ones had not emerged yet. Such wea-
kening of institutions strongly affected the redistribution of power among 
groups within the society. In Lithuania, in the process of transformation and 
state building, the new elite groups evolved from the national opposition [7, 
p. 321]. The British researcher, A. Lieven identifies three segments of 
this national opposition: the members of communist ex-nomenklatura, 
highly qualified engineers, cultural figures and experts in humanities [9, 
p. 225]. At the same time, one cannot ignore the role of representatives of 
the US Lithuanian diaspora. However, in this article, I will focus only on 
one segment of the political elite — the so called “moral politicians”. 
It is worth noting that, in Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia, it was “ex-
perts in humanities” who came to the foreground in the late 1980s — ear-
ly 1990s. So, In Latvia, the initiative to create the Popular Front came 
from the chairperson of the Latvian Writer’s Union, Jānis Peters, other ac-
tivists included professors of the University of Latvia, journalists (Dainis 
Īvāns and others), etc. One of the leaders of the Popular Front of Estonia was 
a literature critic Rein Veidemann; activists included a theatre critic, Paul 
Allik, a sociologist Klara Hallik, and others. As to Poland, at the turn of the 
1980s, experts in humanities played an important role in the negotiations of 
the so called „round table”; one of the most vivid examples is an outstanding 
public figure, a journalist Adam Michnik, who was active in political oppo-
 International relations 
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sition. All in all, in CEE countries, the rise of „humanists” to power is one of 
the most distinctive features of the political transformation after the collapse 
of the communist bloc. In Hungary, a playwright and a literary translator, 
Árpád Göncz, was elected president; in the Czech Republic, it was a play-
wright, a writer, and a dissident Václav Havel; in Bulgaria, a philosopher  
Zh. Zhelev, etc.2 
The „moral politicians” made a significant contribution to laying the 
foundation of a new political order. But, in most cases, they could not stay in 
power. The Lithuanian researcher, Marius Povilas Šaulauskas, claiming that 
it was the representatives of the former Soviet intelligentsia that — to a great 
degree — initiated and became the driving force of the first stages of trans-
formations, emphasizes that they suffered most damage being forced to leave 
the leading political position. “It seems that the post-communist revolution 
took place not because it was good for those behind it, but it was initiated for 
the sake of creative joy and even corresponding aesthetic pleasure”, Šau-
lauskas writes [20, p. 93], proposing the “humanities-driven” understan-
ding of Douglass North’s idea, according to which institutions are not always 
established to the effect of the social efficiency, but to serve the interests of 
those who hold positions entitling to formulating new rules [29, p. 33]. 
In Lithuania, mid — 1988 saw the emergence of Sąjūdis3 — a mass 
union of citizens, which turned later into an important source of political 
elite recruitment in the post-Soviet Lithuania. Alongside ex-communists, the 
core of Sąjūdis was composed of representatives of Lithuanian academic and 
artistic circles, the so called “moral politicians”, namely, philosophers Arvy-
das Juozaitis, Romualdas Ozolas, Vytautas Petkevičius, Bronius Genzelis, a 
historian Meilė Lukšienė, poets Sigitas Geda and Justinas Marcinkevičius, 
an actor Regimantas Adomaitis, a director Arūnas Žebriūnas, a musicologist 
Vytautas Landsbergis, journalists Algimantas Čekuolis and Ina Marčiulio-
nytė, an author and a translator Virgilijus Čepaitis, a musician Algirdas 
Kaušpėdas, an architect Algimantas Nasvytis, and others. 
In the conditions, when uncertainty became the basic feature of the poli-
tical system, and the old institutions and actors lost their influence or were 
bereft of it (it relates, first of all, to the representatives of the communist 
nomenklatura), it was the humanists, intellectuals — formerly in opposition 
to the established order — who were “called” to the pinnacle of power in the 
period of extremely intensive changes, which affected all spheres of social 
                                                     
2 On the earlier interaction between intellectuals and authorities in CEE see, for  
example: Szelenyi I., Konrad G. The Intellectuals on the Road to Class Power. New 
York, 1979. P. 252 ; Селеньи И. Интеллигенция и власть: опыт Восточной Ев-
ропы 1960—1980-е гг. // Рубеж. 1995. № 6—7. С. 198—224 (Szelenyi, I. 1995, 
Intelligencija i vlast': opyt Vostochnoj Evropy 1960—1980-e [Intellectuals and po-
wer: the experience of Eastern Europe 1960—1980-s.], Rubezh [Frontier], no. 6—7, 
p. 198—224.) 
3 At first, it was called the Reform Movement of Lithuania. Sajudis means “move-
ment” in Lithuanian. 
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life. “Moral politicians”, if we apply “Stanford” terminology, acted not only 
as agents of demand mobilisation, but as “crisis accelerators”, who brought 
mass sentiments to life4. 
At first, Sąjūdis was dominated by Vilnius residents, the metropolitan 
humanities elite, which was quite “cosmopolitan” and had important con-
nections both within the party nomenklatura and in the West. Its members 
enjoyed a high social status and did not consider Sąjūdis a career lift. But 
gradually, residents of Kaunas — predominantly engineers, for whom Sąjū-
dis was not only an instrument of implementing political ideas, but also a 
means to get to the top of a career ladder — started to play an increasingly 
important role in the movement. The Kaunas residents are more radical and 
orientated towards old, pre-Soviet Lithuania, rather than the West [32, p. 53]. 
This division between the two capitals — Vilnius and Kaunas — is inte-
gral to Lithuania. Most influential Lithuanians were born in either Vilnius or 
Kaunas; the cities are home to the main national academic centres competing 
for intellectual leadership — Kaunas and Vilnius Universities. 
The leaders of the Lithuanian post-communist transformation are not 
professional politicians, but rather critically thinking members of the intel-
lectual elite (poets, philosophers, musicians, actors, etc.) [20, p. 81]. Algis 
Krupavičius calls them “alternative elite”, composed of the representatives 
of local educated classes looking for new career opportunities and orientated 
towards patriotic values [8]. 
The first free elections to the Supreme council of 1990 resulted in a land-
slide victory of Sąjūdis. Sąjūdis membership is a common line in CVs of 
many of those who joined new Lithuanian political elite not only in the first 
years of independence, but also later. One of them is Vytautas Landsbergis, 
who might be called the most vivid example of a Lithuanian “moral politi-
cian” — Kaunas-born, a former teacher at Vilnius Conservatory, never a 
member of the Communist Party, a pianist, music scholar, professor, the author 
of several books on Lithuanian composers, the chairperson of the Supreme 
Council of Lithuania in 1990—1992, the speaker of the Seimas in 1996—
2000, one of the founders and a long-standing leader of the Homeland Union 
party, a member of the European Parliament. 
According to Alfred Senn, through his rhetorical style, Landsbergis cre-
ated the image of a “philosopher king”, a lonely figure fighting for the imp-
lementation of the will of people [21, p. 310]. A. Lieven writes that there is 
no doubt that Prof. Landsbergis saw himself as a political successor to Anta-
nas Smetona5. He mentioned Smetona with admiration in his speeches and 
partially borrowed his symbols. Landsbergis was not interested in adminis-
trative, financial, and legislative issues, preferring visits abroad, symbols, 
and Lithuanian culture, which he loved deeply [9, p. 68]. 
                                                     
4 In the case of the Baltics, a good example of such mass sentiments is the so called 
“Baltic way”: during protests against the actions taken by the USSR leadership, almost 
2 ml of Lithuanian, Latvian, and Estonian residents joined hands and formed a “live 
chain” of a length of almost 600 km. 
5 Antanas Smetona was a Lithuanian political figure, who established an authorita-
tive regime in the country as a result of a coup; in 1940, he fled to Germany. 
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Having achieved their main political goal, the leaders of the period of 
early independence, the period of “big politics” were not ready to solve the 
problems of the peacetime — building of a new state. Most of them held a 
degree in humanities, they did not have any administrative experience, and 
were interested in the issues of state building and economic management 
much less than in those of culture, symbols and historical past [35, p. 90]. 
In this sense, it is constant references to the past in search of a new foun-
dation for formulating a post-Soviet political agenda that can explain Lands-
bergis’s attempt to create a strong institution of presidency (at the expense of 
development of parliamentarianism and a multi-party system) with an inten-
tion to occupy this position himself and turn Sąjūdis into his support base — 
a “messianic party of national interest” [15]. The attempt failed, followed by 
a schism of Lithuanian “moral politicians”, who were earlier united by the 
idea of independent Lithuania. Intellectuals did not act unanimously as befo-
re; the National future forum was established (K. Prunskienė and A. Juozai-
tis are among its members) to fight against the threat of Landsbergis’s dic-
tatorship. 
In the context of referring to the past in search of foundations for new 
political agenda, one cannot but mention D. Lerner’s idea of the social mobi-
lisation (it was used in the framework of Stanford project), which, as I. Oku-
nev cleverly put it, “creates modernity by not exactly modern means” [30,  
p. 137]. For those, who led the Lithuanian “moral politicians”, the past, the 
old pre-Soviet public practices, the then rules of the game seemed to be a 
desirable future, the goal they tried to reach despite internal and external 
complications. And sometimes, in their attempts to reform the modernity 
using the template of the past, they acted too radically and ignored the key 
for any politician quality — the propensity to a compromise. As a result, in 
the course of the ensuing institutionalisation of Lithuanian political life and 
the formation of a coalition of “moral politicians”, who became the voice 
of the Singing Revolution at the dawn of independence and in its first 
years, they rapidly lost their positions and were forced to the fringe of po-
litical life. As A. Samalavicius believes, they should partially blame them-
selves for losing the competition for the right to control power leverages: 
“While the society's priorities were rapidly changing, they still continued to 
talk in the outdated language of the "Singing Revolution". Besides, they did 
not feel that the society's values had changed when Lithuania encountered 
economic difficulties (particularly when Moscow began an economic blo-
ckade) — individualism, pragmatism and striving for personal gain had be-
gun to thrive and the bonds of social solidarity to crumble. Intellectuals re-
turned to their professional and academic milieu, alienated themselves from 
civil initiatives and sometimes openly loathed political activity.” [19, p. 3]. 
The famous Lithuanian sociologist, Vladas Gaidys identifies another reason 
for humanists-intellectuals having gradually lost their former standing. He 
believes that, in the post-Soviet Lithuania, they lost their chief weapon — 
the right to have their own opinion, for, in the new conditions; it was avai-
lable for everyone [5, p. 139]. 
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In 1992, Sąjūdis lost parliamentary elections; in 1993 it ceased to exist 
as a unified political force giving rise to other movements and becoming the 
“backbone” of the ruling party of Lithuanian conservatives (Homeland Uni-
on). A more valuable resource for the recruitment of political elite in the 
changing conditions of the 1990s was the administrative skills integral to 
Lithuanian ex-nomenklatura. Ex-communists, being experienced in political 
games and familiar with the public administration mechanisms, replaced po-
litically untried non-professionals from Sąjūdis [11, p. 31]. “Moral politi-
cians” found themselves well away from the centre of political activities. 
The ex-first secretary of the Central Committee of the Lithuanian Com-
munist Party, Algidras Brazauskas, who, until his demise, was considered 
the chief opponent of Landsbergis, was elected president. The role of ex-
communists in new Lithuania is so significant, that the Lithuanian elite can 
be called bipolar, divided into two opposing camps — the alliance of Bra-
zauskas (left-wing elites) and the alliance of Landsbergis (right-wing elites) 
[5, p. 124]. 
Brazauskas and Landsbergis are traditionally considered in opposition; 
the former is believed to be a typical pragmatist and realist, the latter is an 
idealist and, to a great degree, a romantic. As R. Lopata shows in his study, 
in terms of their approaches to Lithuanian history and politics it is not quite 
so: “President” A. Brazauskas is a romantic, whereas “Professor” Landsber-
gis, despite the feeling of personal involvement in the history of Lithuania 
(through the “genetic past”)6, is a technocrat and a calculating geopolitical 
player [10, p. 139—142]. 
In this context, it is useful to invoke Pierre Bourdieu’s theory of capital 
conversion [3], which makes it possible to state that, during the transforma-
tion period, Landsbergis and Brazauskas managed to convert their social 
capital into political one. Brazauskas managed to stay on top among the elite 
thanks to his high proficiency, wide experience in political work and public 
administration, and good connections made over the years of the party in-
volvement. Landbsergis’s political “equipment” rested on symbolic capital: 
1) an appeal to the pre-war history of Lithuania and the use of nationalistic 
argumentation; 2) the formation of a foundation for prospective political 
programme of Lithuania in the context of the “return to the West”; 3) the 
perception of Russia as a potential (also military) threat and the application 
of Russophobic rhetoric. 
It is the age of “moral politicians”, when the outlines of the future cons-
titutional order of new Lithuania were drawn and the foundations for further 
relations with Russia were laid. According to clause 1 of the Constitutional 
Act of Non-alignment of the Republic of Lithuania to Post-Soviet Eastern 
Alliances of February 11, 1991, which preceded the Constitution of Lithua-
nia of June 8, 1992, the former Lithuanian SSR “aspires to develop mutually 
beneficial connections with all states that earlier constituted the USSR, but 
will never and under no circumstances accede to any political, military, eco-
                                                     
6 During the war, V. Landsbergis’s father was a member the Provisional Govern-
ment of Lithuania and emigrated after the war. 
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nomic or other alliances or commonwealths established on the basis of the 
former USSR” [32]. The body of legislative acts, which has formed over the 
past 20 years, and numerous cases from modern political reality offer other 
examples of similar attitude towards cooperation with Russia. Such an ap-
proach is also characteristic of the other Baltic countries, which is corrobo-
rated (in line with K. Waltz’s idea of weak countries gravitating to stronger 
ones, for instance, for defence purposes [22]) by official documents7. 
Gradually, the post-communist political elite (which is most pronounced 
in the parliamentary segment) became dominated by people holding degrees 
in technology [13, p. 56]. The analysis of the occupational structure of the 
members of the Lithuanian Seimas conducted by an influential researcher 
of elites, Irmina Matonyte, shows a marked tendency — a significant 
(almost threefold) decrease in the number of academicians and artists. 
While in 1990, university teachers and professors accounted for 33.1 % 
and journalists and writers for 10.5 % of the members of parliament, in 
2004, their weight reduced to 12.1 and 2.1 % respectively. This process 
was accompanied by a considerable increase in the number of officials 
and businesspeople: they accounted for 7.5 and 12.8 % respectively in 
1990 and 27 and 38.3 % in 2004 [12, p. 125]. 
A similar trend is registered by the Estonian researcher, Vello Pettai, 
who, having analysed the occupational structure of aspirant members of the 
Seimas of Lithuania in 1992, 1996, and 2000, came to a conclusion that 
whereas, at the initial stage of Lithuanian independence, the political elite 
was most accessible for “humanists”, in a decade, most successful candida-
tes are CEOs and bureaucrats [18, p. 19]. 
These changes observed in the process of political transformation in 
Lithuania are characteristic not only of the Baltics but also of a number of 
other CEE countries. According to the German researcher, M. Edinger, 
whereas earlier one of five members of parliament worked in the field of ed-
ucation, in the late 1990s, this ratio decreased to one of ten. Teachers and 
professors gave way to people involved in political decision-making in their 
professional life. Parliaments of CEE countries boast a significant number of 
business people and CEOs. In 15—20 years, after the regime change, they 
became the largest occupational group. Erdinger comes to the following 
conclusion: there are two major trends characteristic of CEE political elites — 
social impermeability and professionalism [36, p. 19]. 
The elite of the transition period overthrew the old regime, which it con-
ceived as its main objective, and served as an agent of mobilising the then 
key demand — the dismantling of the communist regime. As the situation 
stabilised and a social equilibrium was achieved, the “input” demands of the 
political system changed, but “moral politicians” continued to offer the same 
decision “output”. In this sense, the case of “moral politicians” can illustrate 
the four-stage Stanford model of development crises, according to which 
                                                     
7 See, for example, Latvia’s foreign policy guidelines (2006—2010) [27], and the 
National Security Concept adopted by the Riigikogu (Parliament of Estonia) in May 
2010 [14]. 
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each stage has a set of certain components integral to it. Demand mobilisa-
tion agents and crisis accelerators belong to the stage of changes in the envi-
ronment and system functioning. Later, there emerges a need for those, who 
must fight for preservation, strengthening, and the development of new rules 
of the game in the framework of forming coalitions, formulating political 
agendas, and redistributing resources. However, the ideas that later became 
the cornerstone of the modern political system of Lithuania and the other 
Baltic countries were proposed by the elite of the late 1980s — early 1990s. 
The issues of the attitude to the Soviet period of Lithuanian history, to the 
sensitive topic of “occupation”, and to Russia in general, which were 
brought to light by the “moral politicians”, are still among most acute and 
dividing in the Lithuanian society. Can one maintain that this line of argu-
mentation, which handles Russia as an “irritant” [34] and was also formula-
ted more than 20 years ago, will remain a priority both in internal political 
interactions and the sphere of international relations for most representatives 
of the Lithuanian political elite? The logic of the economic cooperation bet-
ween Russia and the Baltics evidently guides the political elites towards 
more pragmatic bilateral relations [27]. At the same time, a number of ac-
tions taken by the Lithuanian leadership (a refusal to participate in the con-
struction of the Baltic Nuclear Power Plant in the Kaliningrad region, an at-
tempt to block negotiations on Russia-EU relations in 2007) corroborates the 
hypothesis that, although most “moral politicians” have left the political 
stage, their contribution into the formation of the policy of the Baltic states 
should not be ignored. In this case, using B. Kapustin’s terminology, one can 
say that the initiatives undertaken by the elites in the period of “big politics” 
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